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COMMENTS 
GIFTS-MISTAKE-RIGHTS OF THE DONOR, DONEE AND THEIR 
SuccEssoRS IN INTEREST TO RELIEF-The right to relief for mistake, 
one of the traditional grounds of equity jurisprudence, has been 
most often discussed in connection with bargain transactions. Only 
infrequently has attention been directed toward the effect of mis-
take in the gift area and the consequent results on the rights of the 
parties involved. The presence of mistake in the setting of gift 
transactions will often give rise to an inquiry as to the right of the 
donee to obtain perfection of the gift, or conversely, the right of 
the donor to obtain cancellation or reformation. In addition, the 
mistake may necessitate a somewhat more complex inquiry if the 
subject of the intended gift has been mistakenly transferred to a 
third party, so that the relative rights of the intended donee as 
against the donor or his successors to reacquire the corpus of the 
gift must be determined. In order to direct attention to these 
problems, it will be assumed throughout the comment that the 
formal requirements of transfer of title have been effected. Thus 
the mistake here discussed will relate either to the quantum of 
the gift, the identity of the subject of the gift, or the identity of 
the donee, rather than to mistake which would cause no interest 
in the property to pass out of the donor.1 So as to focus on those 
aspects relatively peculiar to gift transactions, it will be assumed 
that the kind or type of mistake is such that in non-gift transactions 
relief would be given.2 
Illustratively, mistake as to the quantum of the gift occurs when 
the donor, intending to give twenty acres of land, by mistake gives 
either more or less, or, intending to give a life estate, by mistake 
1 When the result of the mistake is that no effective transfer occurs, somewhat dif-
ferent considerations are involved. The abortive gift does not occasion any loss to the 
donor, since he continues to retain all the property rights in the subject matter which 
he had prior to the attempted gift. Thus the problem of restitution in favor of the 
donor does not arise. Further, the donee is unable to point to the necessary legal acts 
which are required for transfer, i.e., delivery with an .intention of finality, and a properly 
executed deed if the transfer is by instrument. A compliance with the formalities for 
transfer. may be necessary before the donee can obtain perfection of his gift. Dowding 
v. Dowding, 152 Neb. 61, 40 N.W. (2d) 245 (1949). REsnnmoN R.EsTATEMENT §164 (1937) 
makes no such distinction. See also "Reformation in Favor of an Intended Donee" in 
DAWSON AND PALMER, CAsES ON R.EsrrnrrION 865 (1958). 
2 Commonly a distinction is made between mistake of fact, for which relief is 
allowed, and mistake of law, for which relief has frequently been denied. However, the 
distinction seems to be of diminishing importance in recent cases. See 3 POMEROY, EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE, 5th ed., §§842, 851 (b) (1941). REsnnmoN R.EsTATEMENT §49 takes the 
position that in gift transactions, restitution for mistake of law will be given as readily 
as for mistake of fact. 
1959] COMMENTS 91 
conveys the fee. An example of mistake in the identity of the sub-
ject of the gift would be the mistaken conveyance of plot A when 
the donor intends plot B to pass. Mistake as to the identity of the 
donee arises when the donor intends to give plot A to X, but by 
mistake conveys it to Y. The subject of the gift may be property 
or services. 
The comment will deal first with three topics, (1) donor's 
rights against the donee or mistaken transferee, (2) donee's rights 
against the donor, and (3) rights of an intended donee against 
the mistaken transferee. This will be followed by a discussion of 
the problem which arises when the relative rights of more than two 
parties are involved. 
I. Donor's Rights 
Frequently the mistake results in either the donee rece1vmg 
more than the donor intended he should receive or a stranger 
receiving property not intended for him at all. In such situations 
the general rule is well established that with the exception of gifts 
to indigents, the donor has a right to restitution from the donee 
or a stranger.3 Unlike the situation with respect to bargain trans-
actions, a showing of mutual mistake is not required in gift trans-
actions generally, and it is only the state of mind of the donor 
that is germane.4 
The reasons for allowing restitution in favor of the donor are 
fairly clear. In contrast to the bargain transaction, the donee or 
transferee has sacrificed nothing to obtain the bounty he has re-
ceived. To permit successful resistance to the donor's attempt 
3 See notes 6 through II infra for authority in support of the general rule. In the so-
called "pauper cases," i.e., charitable gifts to indigents, restitution frequently has been 
denied. See SEAVEY AND Scorr, NOTES TO TIIE R.EsTATEMENT OF REsrrnmoN §26 (1937). 
There seems to be little, if any, rational basis for the exception, however. For a dis-
cussion of the problem of restitution from paupers, see comment, 41 MICH. L. REv. 149 
(1942). 
4E.g., Tyler v. Larson, 106 Cal. App. (2d) 317, 235 P. (2d) 39 (1951); Mitchell v. 
Mitchell, 40 Ga. 11 (1869); Crockett v. Crockett, 73 Ga. 647 (1884); Matter of Clark, 233 
App. Div. 487, 253 N.Y.S. 524 (1931). See also Pickslay v. Starr, 149 N.Y. 432, 44 N.E. 
163 (1896); Ferrell v. Ferrell, 53 W. Va. 515, 44 S.E. 187 (1903). But see Maxwell v. 
Maxwell, 12 Wash. (2d) 589, 123 P. (2d) 335 (1942). 
The reasons that only the donor's intention is relevant are grounded in our concept 
of private property. The property concept assumes that a person has control over what 
he owns. A necessary incident to that control is an ius disponendi, and this right of dis-
posal in accordance with his wishes should not be overridden unless there is justification for 
doing so. The threat of loss of bargained-for rights in another party may be suf-
ficient to override the right to dispose (e.g., contract); public purposes may also over-
ride the right to dispose (e.g., eminent domain). No such overriding reasons are thought 
to exist, however, for the protection of a mistaken voluntary transferee. See generally 
POUND, AN INTRODUcrION TO TIIE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw, rev. ed., 107-132 (1954). 
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to adjust the property rights between the parties so as to comply 
with the only relevant intention involved in the transaction, that 
of the donor, would be to sanction an unjust enrichment. Fur-
ther, underlying considerations of certainty and finality which 
are entitled to full weight in business situations are not as sig-
nificant in gift transactions. As long as the supposed donee is 
afforded some protection for his reliance or change of position 
as a result of the gift, 5 there is little to be said for allowing him 
to keep the property, while considerations of fairness would seem 
to call for restoration to the donor of that which he did not intend 
to give. 
The particular relief which the donor seeks will vary with the 
circumstances of the case and the nature of the subject matter of 
the gift. When the donor intends to give some interest in land, 
but by mistake gives too much, reformation of the deed is avail-
able to correct either the description of the property6 or the quan-
tum of the estate.7 If the mistake is such that to accomplish the 
donor's. true intention the donee should receive no interest in 
the land at all, then cancellation is possible.8 ·when the subject 
of the gift is personalty, the donor may obtain specific restitution,9 
through the imposition of a constructive trust,1° or cancellation 
of the instrument of transfer if one is involved.11 
5 See Scott, "Restitution from an Innocent Transferee Who Is Not a Purchaser for 
Value,""62 HARV. L. REv. 1002 (1949), for a discussion of change of position as a partial 
01 complete defense by the transferee. 
6 E.g., Mitchell v. Mitchell, 40 Ga. 11 (1869) (description reformed to decrease acreage 
given). 
7 E.g., Tyler v. Larson, 106 Cal. App. (2d) 317, 235 P. (2d) 39 (1951) (reformation 
to tenancy in common rather than joint tenancy); Schrieber v. Goldsmith, 39 Misc. 381, 
79 N.Y.S. 846 (1902) (reformation to reserve life estate· to the donor); Delap v. Leonard, 
189 App. Div. 87, 178 N.Y.S. 102 (1919) (reformation to include a contingent remainder 
in favor of the donor); Day v. Day, 84 N.C. 408 (1881) (reformation to reserve a life 
estate to the donor). 
8 See, e.g., Hutson v. Hutson, 168 Md. 182, 177 A. 177 (1935) (cancellation of deed to 
putative wife given by mistake); Mulock v. Mulock, 31 N.J. Eq. 594 (1879), revd. in part 
on other grounds, 32 N.J. Eq. 348 (1880) (cancellation of deeds to son when given by 
mistake). 
9 Tuttle v. Doty, 203 Mich. I, 168 N.W. 990 (1918) (restitution of stock certificates 
in favor of donor showing mistake). 
10 Andrews v. Andrews, 12 Ind. 348 (1859) (donee holds proceeds from sale of land 
given to her by mistake on constructive trust for donor); Ferguson v. Deuble, 27 Ohio Law 
Abst. 533 (1938) (donee who is given joint and survivorship rights in a bank account by 
mistake holds as a constructive trustee for the donor). Contra to tl1e cases allowing the 
donor relief for mistake is Pickslay v. Starr, 149 N.Y. 432, 44 N.E. 163 (1896). 
11 Lady Hood of Avalon v. McKinnon, (1909] I Ch. Div. 476 (gratuitous deed of 
trust corpus cancelled on ground of mistake); Lister v. Hodgson, [1867] L.R. 4 Eq. 30 
(deed of gift of a moneyed fund cancelled); Matter of Clark, 233 App. Div. 487, 253 N.Y.S. 
524 (1931) (assigument of an interest in an estate cancelled). 
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Where the gift is one of services, however, the courts have not 
agreed on whether the donor can get relief. This situation fre-
quently arises when the donor intends to give his services gratui-
tously, but in the mistaken belief that the donee is destitute or 
that the parties are validly married. A suit by the donor on a 
theory of implied in fact contract has generally been unsuccessful,12 
and possibly this line of authority has had an adverse influence 
when the donor's theory is quasi-contractual, or implied in law 
contract, for the donor has not always recovered in quasi-contract.13 
Nonetheless, relief has been given to the mistaken donor in several 
instances on the quasi-contractual theory,14 and this seems to be 
the sounder view. 
One problem arising only infrequently when the donor seeks 
restitution is whether he must "do equity" by transferring to the 
donee the property which he actually intended the donee to have. 
In one case an equitable decree of cancellation in favor of the 
donor was conditioned on the execution of a deed which did con-
form to his proven intent;15 in another case the donor's prayer 
for cancellation of the deed of gift was denied, but his alternate 
prayer for reformation granted when the findings indicated an 
intention to give some lesser interest in the property.16 In con-
trast to these decisions, an unconditional decree of cancellation 
was given where the donor merely demonstrated that a greater 
estate had been given by mistake than was intended,17 and in an 
English case, cancellation rather than reformation was thought 
to be the proper remedy on the stated ground that equity will not 
give effect to an imperfect voluntary conveyance.18 In situations 
where the donee was meant to receive some interest in the property 
transferred to him, it would seem that the better view is to require 
the donor to leave the donee with the intended interest.19 Effec-
tive transfer to the donee has been achieved in these cases, and 
the donor, in presenting clear proof of the mistake in order to get 
12 E.g., Frain v. Brady, 48 R.I. 24, 134 A. 645 (1926). Cf. Spencer v. Spencer, 181 Mass. 
471, 63 N.E. 947 (1902); WOODWARD, QUASI·CONTRACTS §46 (1913). But see In re Agnew's 
Will, 132 Misc. 466, 230 N.Y.S. 519 (1928), noted 42 HARv. L. REv. 283 (1928). 
13 Cropsey v. Sweeney, 27 Barb. (N.Y.) 310 (1858). 
14 Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. (2d) 708, 200 P. (2d) 49 (1948); Sanguinetti 
v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. (2d) 95, 69 P. (2d) 845 (1937). See also Dusenka v. Dusenka, 221 
Minn. 234, 21 N.W. (2d) 528 (1946). 
15 Murphy v. Steel, 169 Ark. 299, 274 S.W. 6 (1925). 
16 Papke v. Pearson, 203 Minn. 130, 280 N.W. 183 (1938). 
17 Manfredo v. Manfredo, 191 Ala. 322, 68 S. 157 (1915). 
18 Lister v. Hodgson, [1867] L.R. 4 Eq. 30. 
19 This view is adopted by the REsnnmoN R.EsrATEMENT §26 (2) (1937). 
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relief, must of necessity prove his actual intention. If actual intent 
is established and there is an effective transfer, it seems capricious 
to allow the donor to recover all the property. If no mistake was 
present, presumably the donee's right to the property would be 
unassailable;20 yet when an additional increment passes to the 
donee by mistake, one view allows the whole transfer to be set 
aside. The relief given to the donor should be tailored to his in-
jury. 
Successors to the donor's interest usually may obtain restitution 
from the donee upon establishing the donor's mistake. Thus resti-
tution has been given to a grantee of the donor's reversionary in-
terest in the property as against a donee who received a greater 
bounty than was intended, the mistake being discovered after the 
reversion was conveyed.21 Apparently the presence or absence 
of consideration in the subsequent grant by donor is not material.22 
Similarly, the estate of a deceased donor generally has a right to 
restitution against a donee who has received more than was in-
tended. 23 
II. Donee Against Donor 
Just as mistake may cause the donee to receive more than was 
intended, it is also possible for the mistake to cause the donee 
to receive less than was intended. In such a situation what rights 
does the donee have against the donor to obtain all the property 
intended to be given? It is in this setting that the maxim "equity 
will not aid a volunteer" has a decisive effect (the word "volun-
teer" meaning the recipient of a benefit conferred for no con-
sideration). 24 It appears to be virtually the universal rule that 
an intended donee may not perfect his gift against a living donor.25 
If the donor wishes to increase the donee's bounty so as to comply 
20Dawson v. Dawson, 16 N.C. 93 (1827). 
21 Jones v. McNealy, 139 Ala. 379, 35 S. 1022 (1904). 
22Adair v. McDonald, 42 Ga. 506 (1871); Miles v. Miles, 84 Miss. 624, 37 S. 112 
(1904). 
23 See, e.g., Tyler v. Larson, 106 Cal. App. (2d) 317, 235 P. (2d) 39 (1951); Johnson 
v. Austin, 86 Ark. 446, 111 S.W. 455 (1908). But see Lathrop v. Sandlin, 223 Ark. 774, 268 
S.W. (2d) 606 (1954). 
24 "Volunteer" is defined by Bouvier as "one who receives a voluntary conveyance." 3 
BouVIER's I.Aw DICTIONARY, 8th ed., 3409 (1914). Frequently the word has been applied 
also to one who confers an unsolicited benefit. 
25 Cases cited in notes 27 and 28 infra support this view. See also 23 R.C.L. 344 
(1919); STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 14th ed., §982 (1918). 
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with the donor's original intention, he is free to do so;26 if on the 
other hand the donor does not wish to fulfill his original intention, 
it is said that what the donor "is not bound to make he is not 
bound to perfect."27 Apparently the underlying principle in this 
situation is that the donee should not "bite the hand that feeds 
him," and the courts will not lend their aid in order that he may 
do so. 
When the donor is no longer living, a somewhat different situa-
tion is presented, for the reasons behind the rule denying the 
donee relief no longer exist. In the first place the donor is no 
longer available to perfect the gift if he should wish to do so. 
Second, when the donor's estate resists the suit of the donee, the 
real parties in interest are usually the residuary legatees or the 
heirs. The intended donee is not "biting the hand that feeds him," 
for neither the heirs or residuary legatees were the source of the 
intended bounty. One court has said, "The heir at law has given 
nothing. It was never his. The grantee does not even owe him 
thanks."28 When the issue is framed in terms of what the donor 
would have done had he been living when the mistake was dis-
covered, the court may be more willing to assume that the donor 
would prefer perfection of the gift rather than allow the mistaken 
grant to stand as made.29 It is for these reasons that in recent years 
several courts have declined to follow the "no aid to a volunteer" 
rule when the donor is deceased, and have allowed the donee to 
compel completion of the intended gift against the donor's estate.30 
Nevertheless, a number of courts have followed a more mechanical 
approach in holding that the donee may not recover, principally 
26 In fact, a donor has been denied the aid of an equity court in such a situation. 
In Langley v. Kesler, 57 Ore. 281, Ill P. 246 (1910), it was held that equity will not supply 
those things which may be in the power or reach of an applicant. 
27 Adair v. McDonald, 42 Ga. 506 at 507 (1871). 
28 Lawrence v. Clark, 115 S.C. 67 at 81, 104 S.E. 330 (1920). 
29 M'Mechan v. Warburton, [1896] I I.R. 435. 
30 Laundreville v. Mero, 86 Mont. 43, 281 P. 749 (1929), noted 14 MINN. L. R.Ev. 425 
(1930), and 43 HAR.v. L. REv. 968 (1930); Hazlett v. Bryant, 192 Tenn. 251, 241 S.W. (2d) 
121 (1951); Green v. Votaw, 192 Okla. 136, 134 P. (2d) 367 (1943); O'Conner v. McCabe, 
42 S.D. 506, 176 N.W. 43 (1920); Lawrence v. Clark, 115 S. C. 67, 104 S.E. 330 (1920); 
Dowding v. Dowding, 152 Neb. 61, 40 N.W. (2d) 245 (1949). Cf. Reina v. Erassarret, 103 
Cal. App. (2d) 258, 229 P. (2d) 92 (1951); Pound, "Consideration in Equity," 13 ILL. L. 
R.Ev. 667 at 673 (1919). REsnnmoN REsrATEMENT §127 imposes an additional limitation, 
that the donee must be a natural object of the donor's bounty. This conforms to the 
facts of most cases cited above, but does not appear as an express requirement in any of 
them. Subsequent to the publication of the Restatement, one court did deny relief on the 
ground that the donee was not a natural object of the donor's bounty. Sweeney v. Peter• 
son, 106 Colo. 287, 103 P. (2d) 1064 (1940). 
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on the theory that since the donee has no right against the donor, 
the donee can not acquire such a right simply because the donor's 
interest now rests in his successors.31 
It also should be noted that the maxim calling for no aid to a 
"volunteer" can be avoided by a showing of the flimsiest sort of 
consideration, which as a practical matter allows a donee to obtain 
perfection of his gift, although in theory the transaction is not 
strictly one of gift. If the grant arises out of a family settlement,32 
or if the donor stands in loco parentis to the donee,83 there is 
"meritorious consideration" sufficient to allow the perfection of 
the gift. Also the slightest monetary payment, such as one dollar,34 
has been found sufficient to avoid the volunteer rule and permit 
the donee substantially to increase his bounty. The fact that the 
courts, especially courts of equity, are willing to indulge in this 
fiction of a bargain transaction indicates a sympathetic attitude 
toward the donee when he seeks reformation against the donor's 
representative. This sympathy is probably grounded in the realiza-
tion that the opposing claimants are often heirs or legatees who 
are also "volunteers." 
III. Intended Donee Against Mistaken Transferee 
It is quite possible that the mistake may result in a transfer of 
the gift property to one who is not the intended donee. One such 
instance occurs when the donor is mistaken as to the identity of the 
31 Marvin v. Kelsey, 373 Ill. 589, 27 N.E. (2d) 469 (1940); Stanforth v. Bailey, 344 Ill. 
38, 175 N.E. 784 (1931); Strayer v. Dickerson, 205 Ill. 257, 68 N.E. 767 (1903); Henry v. 
Henry, 215 Ill. 205, 74 N.E. 126 (1905); Lyon v. Balthis, 24 Ohio App. 57 (1926); Powell 
v. Powell, 27 Ga. 36 (1859); Else v. Kennedy, 67 Iowa 376, 25 N.W. 290 (1885); Union 
Trust Co. v. Boardman, 215 App. Div. 73, 213 N.Y.S. 277 (1925); Smith v. Smith, 80 Ark. 
458, 97 S.W. 439 (1906); Browne v. Gorman, (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) 208 S.W. 385; Shears 
v. Westover, II0 Mich. 505, 68 N.W. 266 (1896); Froman v. Froman, 13 Ind. 317 (1859). 
See also Skelton v. Tyner, 247 Ala. 5II, 25 S. (2d) 160 (1946); Abbot, "Mistake of Fact as a 
Ground for Affirmative Equitable Relief," 23 HARV. L. R.Ev. 608 at 620 (1910). Some 
decisions have stated that the heir of his own merit has an equity greater than or equal to 
that of the intended donee in certain cases. Hout v. Hout, 20 Ohio St. II9 (1870); 
Willey v. Hodge, 104 Wis. 81, 80 N.W. 75 (1899); Enos v. Stewart, 138 Cal. ll2, 70 P. 
1005 (1902); Triesback v. Tyler, 62 Fla. 580, 56 S. 947 (19ll). 
32 E.g., Partridge v. Partridge, 220 Mo. 321, ll9 S.W. 415 (1909); Elliott v. Daves, 176 
Miss. 846, 170 S. 680 (1936); Uebbing v. Koester, 14 Ohio C. C. Rep. (N.S.) 553 (1908), 
affd. 81 Ohio St. 564 (1910). 
sa E.g., Powell v. Morisey, 98 N.C. 426, 4 S.E. 185 (1887); Hutsell v. Crewse, 138 Mo. 
1, 39 S.W. 449 (1897). 
84 Mason v. Moulden, 58 Ind. l (1887). See Lefsey v. Mims, 193 Ga. 780, 20 S.E. (2d) 
32 (1942); Scott v. Grow, 301 Mich. 226, 3 N.W. (2d) 254 (1942). Cases on meritorious 
consideration are collected in 69 A.L.R. 423 at 438 (1930), supplemented in 128 A.L.R. 1299 
(1940). 
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donee and transfers the property to a stranger rather than to the 
intended donee. A similar situation arises when there are simul-
taneous gifts to more than one donee, but mistake causes one 
donee to receive what another should have been given, and vice 
versa.35 It has been stated previously that the donor or his suc-
cessors in interest are entitled to restitution from the unintended 
transferee.36 The question now to be considered is whether the 
intended donee is entitled to obtain from the transferee the 
property which the donor intended he should have. 
The means by which the transferee obtained the property may 
be controlling. Where the mistaken transferee is not guilty of 
tortious conduct, it seems that the intended donee has no rights 
against the transferee during the donor's lifetime. The reasons for 
this are similar to those which apply in the absence of a third party. 
The donor is empowered to act if he wishes to correct the mistake 
by reacquiring the property from the transferee and then complet-
ing the gift to the intended donee. Conversely, if the donor wishes 
to leave the parties in status quo, thereby affirming the transfer, 
he is privileged to do so. 
When the donor is dead, however, the intended donee on a 
showing of the mistake is permitted to complete his gift against 
either an excessively enriched co-donee37 or a stranger who re-
ceived the property in the same transaction which gave rise to the 
intended donee's claim.38 The rationale seems to be that since both 
parties are "volunteers" whose rights arise in the same transaction, 
their equities would normally be equal, so that as between the two, 
the donor's true intention should control.39 Several cases have 
clearly distinguished the transferee who takes an interest in the 
gift property at the same time the intended donee acquires his 
rights, from the transferee who subsequently acquires title to the 
85 As to the excess property which the co-donee receives, he may be treated as if he 
were a stranger. 
86 See text at note 3 supra. Of course if the transferee conveys to a bona fide purchaser, 
tl1e donor's right to the specific property is cut off. German Mutual Ins. Co. v. Grim, 
32 Ind. 249 (1869). 
87 Reinberg v. Heiby, 404 Ill. 247, 88 N.E. (2d) 848 (1949); Simms v. Simms, 139 Misc. 
726, 249 N.Y.S. 171 (1931); Kiser v. Lucas, 170 Md. 486, 185 A. 441 (1936); Huss v. Morris, 
63 Pa. 367 (1869); Spencer v. Spencer, 115 Miss. 71, 75 S. 770 (1917); Weir v. Van Tromp, 
16 T.L.R. 531 (1900). 
38 Swinebroad v. Wood, 123 Ky. 664, 97 S.W. 25 (1906); Mattingly v. Speak, 67 Ky. 316 
(1867); Larkins v. Biddle, 21 Ala. 252 (1852). 
39 Miles v. Miles, 84 Miss. 624, 37 S. 112 (1904); Adair v. McDonald, 42 Ga. 506 (1871). 
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property.40 The subsequent transferee-is thought to stand in the 
place of the donor, and may assert the donor's rights to the same 
extent that the donor's heirs or legatees are able to do so.41 
When the third party transferee has obtained the property by 
tortious conduct (e.g., fraud), the Restatement of Restitution 
takes the position that the intended donee has a right against the 
transferee both during and after the donor's life-time.42 No cases, 
however, have been found to support this view. 
IV. The Problem of Multiple Claimants 
When a mistake results in the gift property being in the hands 
of the wrong person, it is sometimes possible that two claims can 
be made upon him, one by the donor or his successors, and the 
other by the intended donee. From the discussion above it can be 
seen that if the donor is living and the mistake is not caused by 
wrongdoing on the part of the transferee, then the donor clearly 
has an exclusive claim to the property. When the donor is dead, 
however, both the donor's estate and the intended donee may have 
claims to the property which is in the hands of an innocent trans-
feree. Another dual claim situation arises if the Restatement posi-
tion regarding tort on the part of the transferee is accepted. In 
this case the property in the hands of the transferee may be subject 
to the claim of the donor or his estate, and to the claim of the 
intended donee, both during or after the donor's life. 
This possibility of dual claims poses the problem of which 
claim has priority in each situation. This priority problem can 
arise in two contexts, first, where all contestants are before the 
court in a single action; and second, where one claimant acting 
alone obtains the property and subsequently is forced to litigate 
his right to the property against the other claimant. 
When all the parties are before the court and the mistaken 
transferee is not guilty of tortious conduct, the contest for the gift 
property arises between the intended donee and the donor's 
successors. The proper resolution of the conflicting claims should 
be by analogy to the two-party situation where the intended donee 
40 Reinberg v. Heiby, 404 Ill. 247, 88 N.E. (2d) 461 (1949); Miles v. Miles, 84 Miss. 
624, 37 S. 112 (1904); Adair v. McDonald, 42 Ga. 506 (1871). But see Gibson v. Johnson, 
148 Ark. 569, 230 S.W. 578 (1921). 
41 See notes 30 and 31 supra. 
42 RE.snTUTION REsTATEMENT §133 (1), comment c, illus. 7, 8, 9 (1937). But see 
special note to §133 in A.L.I., PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, REsTITUTION REsTATE.'d'.ENT 267 (1936), 
and dictum contra to §133 in Peters v. Priest, 134 Ark. 161, 203 S.W. 1042 (1918). 
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is claiming against the donor's estate. If the jurisdiction is one 
which would permit the donor's estate successfully to resist the 
intended donee's claim when the estate continues to possess the gift 
property, then it would be proper to allow the donor's estate (or 
successors in interest) to prevail when three parties are involved.43 
If the jurisdiction is one which allows perfection of the gift against 
the donor's estate, then the intended donee should have the 
superior claim against the third-party transferee.44 In other words, 
it seems equitable to weigh the relative rights of the claimants 
against the third-party transferee by reference to the claimants' 
rights inter se. 
If the transferee obtained the property through tortious con-
duct, this again provides two potential claimants, the intended 
donee and the donor or his estate. Here again by analogy to the 
two-party situation of donor and donee it would seem • that when 
all parties are before the court, the living donor's claim should be 
superior, since the intended donee can not compel the donor to 
complete a gift which is imperfect due to mistake. This view is 
reinforced by the Restatement position that if the donor reacquires 
the property from the tortious transferee, the intended donee's 
right to restitution is terminated.45 
The most interesting question arises not when all parties are 
before the court but when the intended donee alone acts first and 
obtains the property. As indicated above, generally he can do 
this after the donor's lifetime, or if the mistaken transferee was 
tortious, during as well as after the donor's lifetime. In such a 
case may the donor or the donor's estate re-acquire the property 
from the donee who has obtained fulfillment of his gift? The 
donor's estate, although capable in some jurisdictions of resisting 
a claim by the intended donee, realistically may represent "volun-
teers" to which equity should hesitate to lend its aid. In addition, 
the donor's intention has been fulfilled by the intended donee's 
suit. It does not seem reasonable to allow the donor's estate to 
point to the mistake, now corrected, as a ground upon which it 
should have a right to the property. 
As to the living donor, there are plausible reasons why he also 
should not be permitted to re-acquire the gift property. The donee 
can point to final intent plus transfer by the donor at one time. 
43 See note 31 supra. 
44 See note 30 supra. 
45 RFsrmmoN RF.sTATEMENT §133 (2) (1937). 
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The donor has done everything that was necessary to divest him-
self of the gift property in favor of the intended donee. To be sure, 
there was a mistake as to the identity of the donee, but that has 
since been corrected, and the donee now holds the property as 
was originally intended. What the donor is not bound to make 
he is not bound to perfect, and therefore in this situation perfec-
tion by the donor is no longer required. In the absence of mistake 
the donor could not revoke the gift because he changed his mind on 
the matter; thus he should not be able to take advantage of the 
fortuitous existence of a mistake, now eliminated, to do what was 
not possible in the absence of mistake. 
But the difficulty with this line of argument is that the ultimate 
rights of the claimants will be determined by a race to judgment 
upon the discovery of the mistake, for it is clear that if the donor 
acts first and obtains the property from the transferee, the intended 
donee cannot compel the donor to complete his gift. The race to 
judgment result seems singularly inappropriate in the setting of 
gift transaction, and should be avoided. When a living donor is 
involved, the question ultimately is whether to prefer an avaricious 
donee or the donor who has changed his mirid; when the donor's 
estate is the claimant, the question is usually one of avaricious 
donee versus the avaricious heir. The best solution would seem 
to be to allow the intended donee no greater rights by reason of his 
initial acquisition of the gift property from the transferee. In 
accordance with the better view, the intended donee should have 
a better right to the property than the donor's estate, whether the 
property is in the hands of the estate or a mistaken transferee. 
When the living donor is the other claimant, however, he should 
have the superior right in all cases. Despite the fact that the policy 
of finality in gifts is somewhat undermined, the donor, as the 
source of the property, should have the right to control its ultimate 
disposition. George E. Parker, III, S.Ed. 
